THE WAR ON TERROR
Below is a copy of a report on the BBC website which is a composition of extracts from the Independent Monitering Commission report on Provisional IRA [PIRA] and other terrorist organisations in Northern Ireland.
Peter Hain defended Labour policy in television interviews following publication of the report, and did not make much, if any, criticism of the IRA.
The IMC: Report extracts
The Independent Monitoring Commission published its 8th report into paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland on Wednesday.
Below are extracts from the main areas of the report.
IRA INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
The organisation continues to accumulate information about individuals and groups, including members of the security forces, though as we indicate above we do not think there is any intent to mount attacks.
We also think that the organisation remains concerned about the potential for action by dissident republican groups and that it continues to monitor their activities, as it does those of some drug dealers.
This is an activity which we believe is authorised by the leadership and which involves some very senior members.
While some of it may be for defensive purposes, it is predominantly directed towards supporting the political strategy.
It involves among other things the continuation of efforts to penetrate public and other institutions with the intention of illegally obtaining or handling sensitive information.
WEAPONS
We referred in our previous report to the significant act of decommissioning reported by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) on 26 September 2005.
We have since received reports that not all PIRA's weapons and ammunition were handed over for decommissioning in September.
These reports are not able to indicate precisely what is the nature or volume of any remaining weapons but suggest two things: first, that there is a range of different kinds of weapons and ammunition; second, that the material goes beyond what might possibly have been expected to have missed decommissioning, such as a limited number of handguns kept for personal protection or some items the whereabouts of which were no longer known.
We recognise that if these reports were confirmed the key question would be how much the PIRA leadership knew about these weapons.
These same reports do not cast doubt on the declared intention of the PIRA leadership to eschew terrorism. For our part, we are clear that this latter is their strategic intent.
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
There are indications that in some areas, PIRA units have been closing down criminal operations and clearing stocks of contraband goods, and we have no reports of PIRA sanctioned robberies in the period under review.
However, members and former members of PIRA continue to be heavily involved in serious organised crime, including counterfeiting and the smuggling of fuel and tobacco. As in the past, we are not able to say confidently to what extent the substantial proceeds of crime are passed to the organisation.
PIRA continues to raise funds and we also believe that it looks to the long term exploitation of the proceeds of earlier crimes, for example through the purchase of property or legitimate businesses. Some senior members are involved in money laundering and other crime.
Money has become a key strategic asset. There has been some restructuring in the finance department, possibly in reflection of the changing circumstances.
PIRA also seems to be using experts and specialists able to assist in the management of illegal assets.
EXILES
It remains our very strong belief that exiling is one of the most insidious manifestations of paramilitary activity. Exiling - or the threat or fear of it - is a key element in the exercise of community control.
The ending of exiling, and allowing those previously exiled freely to return home should they wish to do so, remain for us one test of whether a paramilitary group has given up illegality. The practice of exiling continues with all groups, in some instances apparently unabated, though in others the number of new cases may have reduced considerably.
Exiling has not been lifted and some relocation of people who are seen as troublesome individuals and families continues. PIRA has used other methods of exercising community control such as "naming and shaming" and we believe the organisation has encouraged members to engage in community restorative justice as a means of exerting local influence.
There are thus some signs of an organisation which wants to maintain its traditional role within its communities.
It does not yet appear ready to change its long standing opposition to the PSNI though the attitude on the ground is variable and appears often to depend on local circumstances or personalities; in some cases there are clear indications of a
growing community readiness to engage with the police.
INTENTIONS
We are of the firm view that the present PIRA leadership has taken the strategic decision to end the armed campaign and pursue the political course which it has publicly articulated. We do not think that PIRA believes that terrorism has a part in this political strategy.
It has issued instructions to its members about this change of mode, and has engaged in internal consultation to support the strategy.
We believe that there is no intention on the part of a number of those (paramilitary) groups, in particular PIRA, to revert to terrorism but there still remain questions about how far this dynamic will develop.
There seems to be a growing awareness within groups on both sides that violence and crime - even if they had been considered an acceptable option in the past - do not now offer a way forward which is either right or likely to bear political fruit in the longer term.
There are signs too in both loyalist and republican communities that increasing numbers of people want to break free of the grip of paramilitary groups. As they do so they can restore a more normal way of life.
LOYALIST ACTIVITY
The UDA has been engaged in continuing paramilitary activity. Members from east Belfast were in our view responsible for the murder on 4 October of their fellow member Jim Gray who was on bail following his arrest.
The UDA and its members have continued to undertake targeting, shootings and assaults, some unreported; the UDA was responsible for most of the loyalist incidents which it is possible to attribute with certainty to a particular organisation, although these attributions are a minority of the total.
We believe that the organisation continues to aspire to acquire weapons although we have no evidence over this period that it has successfully done so. We are aware of no change in the broad pattern of UDA involvement in organised crime.
Members of the organisation were engaged in drug dealing, extortion, the production and sale of counterfeit goods, money laundering and robbery.
The level of UVF activity has been less than it was in the six months covered by our previous report, mainly because of the ending of the feud with the LVF.
Despite the welcome steps the leadership has taken on the feud and other crime we do not at this stage change our overall assessment of the organisation. It remains a continuing and serious threat to the rule of law and our previous phrase - active, violent and ruthless - still applies to it.
The BBC is not responsible for the content of external internet sites
Peter Hain defended Labour policy in television interviews following publication of the report, and did not make much, if any, criticism of the IRA.
The IMC: Report extracts
The Independent Monitoring Commission published its 8th report into paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland on Wednesday.
Below are extracts from the main areas of the report.
IRA INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
The organisation continues to accumulate information about individuals and groups, including members of the security forces, though as we indicate above we do not think there is any intent to mount attacks.
We also think that the organisation remains concerned about the potential for action by dissident republican groups and that it continues to monitor their activities, as it does those of some drug dealers.
This is an activity which we believe is authorised by the leadership and which involves some very senior members.
While some of it may be for defensive purposes, it is predominantly directed towards supporting the political strategy.
It involves among other things the continuation of efforts to penetrate public and other institutions with the intention of illegally obtaining or handling sensitive information.
WEAPONS
We referred in our previous report to the significant act of decommissioning reported by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) on 26 September 2005.
We have since received reports that not all PIRA's weapons and ammunition were handed over for decommissioning in September.
These reports are not able to indicate precisely what is the nature or volume of any remaining weapons but suggest two things: first, that there is a range of different kinds of weapons and ammunition; second, that the material goes beyond what might possibly have been expected to have missed decommissioning, such as a limited number of handguns kept for personal protection or some items the whereabouts of which were no longer known.
We recognise that if these reports were confirmed the key question would be how much the PIRA leadership knew about these weapons.
These same reports do not cast doubt on the declared intention of the PIRA leadership to eschew terrorism. For our part, we are clear that this latter is their strategic intent.
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
There are indications that in some areas, PIRA units have been closing down criminal operations and clearing stocks of contraband goods, and we have no reports of PIRA sanctioned robberies in the period under review.
However, members and former members of PIRA continue to be heavily involved in serious organised crime, including counterfeiting and the smuggling of fuel and tobacco. As in the past, we are not able to say confidently to what extent the substantial proceeds of crime are passed to the organisation.
PIRA continues to raise funds and we also believe that it looks to the long term exploitation of the proceeds of earlier crimes, for example through the purchase of property or legitimate businesses. Some senior members are involved in money laundering and other crime.
Money has become a key strategic asset. There has been some restructuring in the finance department, possibly in reflection of the changing circumstances.
PIRA also seems to be using experts and specialists able to assist in the management of illegal assets.
EXILES
It remains our very strong belief that exiling is one of the most insidious manifestations of paramilitary activity. Exiling - or the threat or fear of it - is a key element in the exercise of community control.
The ending of exiling, and allowing those previously exiled freely to return home should they wish to do so, remain for us one test of whether a paramilitary group has given up illegality. The practice of exiling continues with all groups, in some instances apparently unabated, though in others the number of new cases may have reduced considerably.
Exiling has not been lifted and some relocation of people who are seen as troublesome individuals and families continues. PIRA has used other methods of exercising community control such as "naming and shaming" and we believe the organisation has encouraged members to engage in community restorative justice as a means of exerting local influence.
There are thus some signs of an organisation which wants to maintain its traditional role within its communities.
It does not yet appear ready to change its long standing opposition to the PSNI though the attitude on the ground is variable and appears often to depend on local circumstances or personalities; in some cases there are clear indications of a
growing community readiness to engage with the police.
INTENTIONS
We are of the firm view that the present PIRA leadership has taken the strategic decision to end the armed campaign and pursue the political course which it has publicly articulated. We do not think that PIRA believes that terrorism has a part in this political strategy.
It has issued instructions to its members about this change of mode, and has engaged in internal consultation to support the strategy.
We believe that there is no intention on the part of a number of those (paramilitary) groups, in particular PIRA, to revert to terrorism but there still remain questions about how far this dynamic will develop.
There seems to be a growing awareness within groups on both sides that violence and crime - even if they had been considered an acceptable option in the past - do not now offer a way forward which is either right or likely to bear political fruit in the longer term.
There are signs too in both loyalist and republican communities that increasing numbers of people want to break free of the grip of paramilitary groups. As they do so they can restore a more normal way of life.
LOYALIST ACTIVITY
The UDA has been engaged in continuing paramilitary activity. Members from east Belfast were in our view responsible for the murder on 4 October of their fellow member Jim Gray who was on bail following his arrest.
The UDA and its members have continued to undertake targeting, shootings and assaults, some unreported; the UDA was responsible for most of the loyalist incidents which it is possible to attribute with certainty to a particular organisation, although these attributions are a minority of the total.
We believe that the organisation continues to aspire to acquire weapons although we have no evidence over this period that it has successfully done so. We are aware of no change in the broad pattern of UDA involvement in organised crime.
Members of the organisation were engaged in drug dealing, extortion, the production and sale of counterfeit goods, money laundering and robbery.
The level of UVF activity has been less than it was in the six months covered by our previous report, mainly because of the ending of the feud with the LVF.
Despite the welcome steps the leadership has taken on the feud and other crime we do not at this stage change our overall assessment of the organisation. It remains a continuing and serious threat to the rule of law and our previous phrase - active, violent and ruthless - still applies to it.
The BBC is not responsible for the content of external internet sites
posted by erc @ 8:56 pm
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